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Abstract
Clinical trials often seek to determine the equivalence, non-inferiority, or superiority
of an experimental condition (e.g., a new drug) compared to a control condition (e.g.,
a placebo or an already existing drug). The use of frequentist statistical methods
to analyze data for these types of designs is ubiquitous. Importantly, however,
frequentist inference has several limitations. Bayesian inference remedies these
shortcomings and allows for intuitive interpretations. In this article, we outline the
frequentist conceptualization of equivalence, non-inferiority, and superiority designs
and discuss its disadvantages. Subsequently, we explain how Bayes factors can
be used to compare the relative plausibility of competing hypotheses. We present
baymedr, an R package that provides user-friendly tools for the computation of
Bayes factors for equivalence, non-inferiority, and superiority designs. Detailed
instructions on how to use baymedr are provided and an example illustrates how
already existing results can be reanalyzed with baymedr.
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1 Introduction
Researchers generally agree that the clinical trial is the best method to compare the
effects of medications and treatments (e.g., E. Christensen, 2007; Friedman, Furberg,
DeMets, Reboussin, & Granger, 2010). Although clinical trials are similar in design,
different statistical procedures need to be employed depending on the nature of
the research question. Commonly, clinical trials seek to determine the superiority,
equivalence, or non-inferiority of an experimental condition (e.g., a new medication)
compared to a control condition (e.g., a placebo or an already existing medication;
Lesaffre, 2008; Piaggio, Elbourne, Pocock, Evans, & Altman, 2012). For these kinds
of goals, statistical inference is often conducted in the form of testing.
Usually, the frequentist approach to statistical testing forms the framework in which
data for these research designs are analyzed (Chavalarias, Wallach, Li, & Ioannidis, 2016).
In particular, a null hypothesis significance test (NHST) is conducted and evidence is
quantified by a p-value. The resulting p-value represents the probability of obtaining a
test statistic at least as extreme as the one observed, assuming that the null hypothesis
is true. In other words, the p-value is an indicator of the unusualness of the obtained test
statistic under the null hypothesis, forming a ‘proof by contradiction’ (R. Christensen,
2005). If the p-value is smaller than a predefined Type I error rate (α), typically set to
α = 0.05 (but see, e.g., Benjamin et al., 2018), we reject the null hypothesis; otherwise
we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
However, the NHST approach to inference has been critiqued due to certain limitations
and erroneous interpretations of p-values (e.g., Berger & Sellke, 1987; Cohen, 1994; Dienes,
2011; Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Vitouch, 2004; Goodman, 1999a, 1999b, 2008; Loftus, 1996;
van Ravenzwaaij & Ioannidis, 2017; Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2018;
Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016; Wetzels et al., 2011). As a result, some methodologists
have argued that p-values should be mostly abandoned from scientific practice (see, e.g.,
Berger & Delampady, 1987; Goodman, 2008; Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
An alternative to NHST is statistical testing within a Bayesian framework. Bayesian
statistics is based on the idea that the credibility of well-defined parameter values or
models (e.g., null and alternative hypotheses) are updated based on new observations
(Kruschke, 2015). With exploding computational power and the rise of Markov chain
Monte Carlo methods (e.g., Gilks, Richardson, & Spiegelhalter, 1995; van Ravenzwaaij,
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Cassey, & Brown, 2018) that are utilized to estimate probability distributions that cannot
be determined analytically, applications of Bayesian inference have recently become
tractable. Indeed, Bayesian methods are seeing more and more use in the biomedical
field (Berry, 2006) and other disciplines (e.g., psychology; van de Schoot, Winter, Ryan,
Zondervan-Zwijnenburg, & Depaoli, 2017).
Despite of this slowly developing paradigm shift away from frequentist towards
Bayesian inference, a majority of biomedical research still employs frequentist statistical
techniques (Chavalarias et al., 2016). To some extent, this might be due to a biased
statistical education in favor of frequentist inference. Moreover, researchers might
perceive conducting of statistical inference through NHST and reporting of p-values
as prescriptive and, hence, adhere to this convention (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2004;
Winkler, 2001). We believe that one of the most crucial factors is the unavailability
of easy-to-use Bayesian tools and software, leaving Bayesian hypothesis testing largely
to statistical experts. Fortunately, important advances have been made towards user-
friendly interfaces for Bayesian analyses with the release of the BayesFactor software
(Morey & Rouder, 2018), written in R (R Core Team, 2019), and point-and-click software
like JASP (JASP Team, 2019) and Jamovi (The jamovi project, 2019), both of which
are based to some extent on the BayesFactor software. However, these tools were mainly
developed for research designs in the social sciences. Easy-to-use Bayesian tools and
corresponding accessible software for the analysis of common biomedical research designs
(e.g., superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority) are still missing and, thus, urgently
needed.
In this article, we describe how to perform Bayesian hypothesis tests for superiority,
equivalence, and non-inferiority designs. Firstly, we outline the traditional frequentist
approach to statistical testing for each of these designs. Secondly, we discuss the
key disadvantages and potential pitfalls of this approach and motivate why Bayesian
inferential techniques are better suited for these research designs. Thirdly, we explain
the conceptual background of Bayes factors (e.g., Goodman, 1999b; Jeffreys, 1939, 1948,
1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). Fourthly, we provide and introduce baymedr (Linde &
van Ravenzwaaij, 2019), an open-source software written in R (R Core Team, 2019) for
the computation of Bayes factors for common biomedical designs. We provide step-by-
step instructions on how to use baymedr. Finally, we present a reanalysis of an existing
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empirical study to illustrate the most important features of baymedr.
2 Frequentist Inference for Superiority, Equivalence,
and Non-Inferiority Designs
The superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority tests are concerned with research
settings in which two conditions (e.g., control and experimental) are compared on some
outcome measure (E. Christensen, 2007; Lesaffre, 2008). For instance, researchers might
want to investigate whether a new antidepressant medication is superior, equivalent, or
non-inferior compared to a well-established antidepressant. The three research designs
are quite similar in that they all contain some form of between-group comparison of
a summary statistic (typically the mean). For a continuous outcome variable, this
comparison is typically made with a t-test. The three designs differ, however, in the
precise specification of the t-test (see Fig 1).
In the following, we will assume that higher scores on the measure of interest represent
a more favorable outcome (i.e., superiority or non-inferiority) than lower scores. For
example, high scores are favorable when the measure of interest represents the number
of social interactions, whereas low scores are favorable when the outcome variable is the
number of depressive symptoms. Application of the opposite case, in which low scores
represent the favorable outcome, follows straightforwardly. We will also assume that the
outcome variable is continuous and approximately normally distributed within conditions.
Throughout this article, the true population effect size (δ) reflects the true standardized
difference in the outcome between the experimental condition and the control condition
(i.e., δ = (µexp − µcon) /σpooled).
2.1 The Superiority Design
The superiority design tests whether the experimental condition is superior to or
better than the control condition (see the first row of Fig 1). Conceptually, the superiority
design consists of a one-sided test due to its inherent directionality. However, researchers
often conduct a two-sided test instead and confirm afterwards that the results follow
the expected direction. Given a one-sided test, the null hypothesis states that the true
5
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Figure 1: Schematic depiction of the superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority designs.
The x-axis represents the true population effect size (δ), where ∆L is the lower equivalence
boundary in case of the equivalence test and the non-inferiority margin in case of the non-
inferiority test and ∆U is the upper equivalence boundary in case of the equivalence test.
Grey regions mark the null hypotheses and white regions the alternative hypotheses. Note
that the diagram assumes that high values on the measure of interest represent superior
or non-inferior values.
population effect size is zero, whereas the alternative hypotheses states that the true
population effect size is larger than zero:
H0 : δ = 0
H1 : δ > 0;
with a two-sided test, the null hypothesis is the same as in the one-sided test and the
alternative hypothesis states that the true population effect size is unequal to zero:
H0 : δ = 0
H1 : δ 6= 0.
To test these hypotheses, either a one- or two-tailed t-test is conducted.
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2.2 The Equivalence Design
The equivalence design tests whether the experimental and control conditions are
practically equivalent (see the second row of Fig 1). There are multiple approaches
to equivalence testing (e.g., the power approach; see Meyners, 2012, for an accessible
overview). A comprehensive treatment of all approaches is beyond the scope of this
article. Here, we focus on a popular alternative: the two one-sided tests procedure
(TOST; Lakens, 2017; Lakens, Scheel, & Isager, 2018; Schuirmann, 1987; Senn, 2008;
Westlake, 1976). An equivalence interval must be defined, which can be based, for
example, on the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI; e.g., Lakens, 2017; Lakens et
al., 2018). The specification of the equivalence interval is not a statistical question; thus,
it should be set by experts in the respective fields (Meyners, 2012; Schuirmann, 1987) or
comply with regulatory guidelines (Garrett, 2003). Importantly, however, the equivalence
interval should be determined prior to data analysis.
TOST involves conducting two one-sided t-tests, each one with its own null and
alternative hypotheses. For the first test, the null hypothesis states that the true
population effect size is smaller than the lower boundary of the equivalence interval,
whereas the alternative hypothesis states that the true population effect size is larger
than the lower boundary of the equivalence interval. For the second test, the null
hypothesis states that the true population effect size is larger than the upper boundary
of the equivalence interval, whereas the alternative hypothesis states that the true
population effect size is smaller than the upper boundary of the equivalence interval.
These hypotheses can be summarized as follows:
H0 : δ < ∆L OR δ > ∆U
H1 : δ > ∆L AND δ < ∆U ,
where ∆L and ∆U represent the lower and upper boundaries of the equivalence interval,
respectively. Two p-values (p1 and p2) result from the application of the TOST procedure.
We reject the null hypothesis of non-equivalence and, thus, establish equivalence if
max (p1, p2) < α (Meyners, 2012; Walker & Nowacki, 2011). In other words, both tests
need to reach statistical significance.
7
2.3 The Non-Inferiority Design
In some situations, we are interested in testing whether the experimental condition
is non-inferior or not worse than the control condition by a certain amount. This is the
goal of the non-inferiority design, which consists of a one-tailed test (see the third row of
Fig 1). Realistic applications might include a new medication that has fewer undesirable
adverse effects (e.g., Chadwick & Vigabatrin European Monotherapy Study Group, 1999),
is cheaper (see, e.g., Kaul & Diamond, 2006, for a discussion), or is easier to administer
than the current medication (e.g., Van de Werf et al., 1999). In these cases, we need to
ponder the cost of a somewhat lower or equal effectiveness of the new treatment with the
value of the just mentioned benefits (Hills, 2017). The null hypothesis states that the
true population effect size is equal to a predetermined threshold, whereas the alternative
hypothesis states that the true population effect size is higher than this threshold:
H0 : δ = −nim
H1 : δ > −nim,
where nim represents the non-inferiority margin. As the equivalence interval, the non-
inferiority margin should be defined a priori.
2.4 Limitations of Frequentist Inference
Tests of superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority have great value in biomedical
research. It is the way researchers conduct their statistical analyses that, we argue,
should be critically reconsidered. There are several disadvantages associated with the
application of NHST to superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority designs. Here, we
limit our discussion to two disadvantages; for a more comprehensive exposition we refer
the reader to Goodman (1999a), Rennie (1978), International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors (1997), and Wagenmakers et al. (2018).
First, researchers need to stick to a predetermined sampling plan (e.g., Rouder, 2014;
Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018; Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini,
2017). That is, it is not legitimate to decide based on interim results to stop data collection
(e.g., because the p-value is already smaller than α) or to continue data collection
beyond the predetermined sample size (e.g., because the p-value almost reaches statistical
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significance). In principle, researchers can correct for the fact that they inspected the
data by reducing the required significance threshold through one of several techniques
(Ranganathan, Pramesh, & Buyse, 2016). However, such correction methods are rarely
applied.
Second, with the traditional frequentist framework it is impossible to quantify evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis (e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &
Iverson, 2009; van Ravenzwaaij, Monden, Tendeiro, & Ioannidis, 2019; Wagenmakers,
2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Oftentimes, the p-value is erroneously interpreted as
a posterior probability, in the sense that it represents the probability for the truth of
the null hypothesis (e.g., Berger & Sellke, 1987; Gelman, 2013; Goodman, 2008; Haller
& Krauss, 2002). However, a non-significant p-value does not only occur when the null
hypothesis is in fact true but also when the alternative hypothesis is true, yet we did not
have enough power to detect an effect (Bakan, 1966; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2019). As
Altman and Bland (1995) put it: “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. Still,
a large proportion of biomedical studies falsely claim equivalence based on statistically
non-significant t-tests (Greene, Concato, & Feinstein, 2000). Yet, estimating evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis is essential for certain designs like the equivalence test
(e.g., Blackwelder, 1982; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2019; see also Hoekstra, Monden, van
Ravenzwaaij, & Wagenmakers, 2018).
The TOST procedure (Lakens, 2017; Lakens et al., 2018; Schuirmann, 1987; Westlake,
1976) for equivalence testing provides a workaround for the problem that evidence for
the null hypothesis cannot be quantified with frequentist techniques by defining an
equivalence interval around δ = 0 and conducting two tests. Without this interval the
TOST procedure would inevitably fail (see Meyners, 2012, for an explanation of why this
is the case). As we will see, the Bayesian equivalence test does not have this restriction;
it allows for the specification of an interval as well as a point null hypothesis.
3 Bayesian Tests for Superiority, Equivalence, and
Non-Inferiority Designs
The Bayesian statistical framework provides a logically sound method to update our
beliefs about parameters based on new data (e.g., Goodman, 1999b; Kruschke, 2015).
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Bayesian inference can be divided into parameter estimation (e.g., estimating a population
correlation) and model comparison (e.g., comparing the relative probabilities of the null
and alternative hypotheses) procedures (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). Here, we will focus
on the latter approach, which is usually accomplished with Bayes factors (e.g., Goodman,
1999b; Jeffreys, 1939, 1948, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). In our exposition of Bayes
factors in general and specifically for superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority designs,
we mostly refrain from complex equations and derivations. Formulas are only provided
when we think that they help to communicate the ideas and concepts. We refer readers
interested in the mathematics of Bayes factors to other sources (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961;
Kass & Raftery, 1995; O’Hagan & Forster, 2004; Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal,
& Grasman, 2010; see also Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018, for a particularly accessible
approach). The precise derivation of Bayes factors for superiority, equivalence, and non-
inferiority designs in particular is treated by van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2019; see also Gronau,
Ly, & Wagenmakers, 2019).
3.1 The Bayes Factor
Let us suppose that we have two hypotheses, H0 and H1, that we want to contrast.
Without considering any data, we have initial beliefs about the probabilities of H0 and
H1, which are given by the prior probabilities pr (H0) and pr (H1) = 1−pr (H0). Now, we
collect some data D. After having seen the data, we have new and refined beliefs about
the probabilities that H0 and H1 are true, which are given by the posterior probabilities
pr (H0|D) and pr (H1|D) = 1 − pr (H0|D). In other words, we update our prior beliefs
about the probabilities of H0 and H1 by incorporating what the data dictates we should
believe and arrive at our posterior beliefs. This relation is expressed in Bayes’ rule:
pr (Hi|D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior
=
Likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
pr (D|Hi)
Prior︷ ︸︸ ︷
pr (Hi)
pr (D|H0) pr (H0) + pr (D|H1) pr (H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Likelihood
, (1)
with i = {0, 1}, and where pr (Hi) represents the prior probability of Hi, pr (D|Hi)
denotes the likelihood of the data under Hi, pr (D|H0) pr (H0) + pr (D|H1) pr (H1) is the
marginal likelihood (also called evidence or prior predictive distribution; cf. Kruschke,
2015 and Gelman et al., 2013, respectively), and pr (Hi|D) is the posterior probability of
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Hi.
As we will see, the likelihood in Eq. 1 is actually a marginal likelihood because
each model (i.e., H0 and H1) contains certain parameters that are integrated out. The
denominator in Eq. 1 (labeled marginal likelihood) serves as a normalization constant,
ensuring that the sum of the posterior probabilities is 1. Without this normalization
constant, however, the posterior is still proportional to the product of the likelihood and
the prior. Therefore, for H0 and H1 we can also write:
pr (Hi|D) ∝ pr (D|Hi) pr (Hi) , (2)
where ∝ means ‘is proportional to’.
Rather than using posterior probabilities for each hypothesis, let the ratio of the
posterior probabilities for H0 and H1 be given by:
pr (H0|D)
pr (H1|D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
=
pr (D|H0)
pr (D|H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor, BF 01
pr (H0)
pr (H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
. (3)
The quantity pr (H0|D) /pr (H1|D) represents the posterior odds and the term
pr (H0) /pr (H1) is called the prior odds. To get the posterior odds, we have to
multiply the prior odds with pr (D|H0) /pr (D|H1), a quantity known as the Bayes factor
(Goodman, 1999b; Jeffreys, 1939, 1948, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995), which is a ratio of
marginal likelihoods:
BF 01 =
∫
θ0
pr (D|θ0,H0) pr (θ0|H0) dθ0∫
θ1
pr (D|θ1,H1) pr (θ1|H1) dθ1 , (4)
where θ0 and θ1 are vectors of parameters under H0 and H1, respectively. In other
words, the marginal likelihoods in the numerator and denominator of Eq. 4 are weighted
averages of the likelihoods, for which the weights are determined by the corresponding
prior. In the case where one hypothesis has fixed values for the parameter vector θi (e.g.,
a point null hypothesis), integration over the parameter space and the specification of a
prior is omitted.
The Bayes factor is the amount by which we would update our prior odds to obtain
the posterior odds, after taking into consideration the data. For example, if we had prior
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odds of 2 and the Bayes factor is 24, then the posterior odds would be 48. In the special
case where the prior odds is 1, the Bayes factor is equal to the posterior odds. A major
advantage of the Bayes factor is its ease of interpretation. For example, if the Bayes factor
(BF01, denoting the fact that H0 is in the numerator and H1 in the denominator) equals
10, the data are ten times more likely to have occurred under H0 compared to H1. With
BF01 = 0.2, we can say that the data are five times more likely under H1 compared to H0
because we can simply take the reciprocal of BF01: BF10 = 1/BF01. What constitutes
enough evidence is subjective and certainly depends on the context. Nevertheless, rules
of thumb for evidence thresholds have been proposed. For instance, Kass and Raftery
(1995) labeled Bayes factors between 1 and 3 as ‘not worth more than a bare mention’,
Bayes factors between 3 and 20 as ‘positive’, those between 20 and 150 as ‘strong’, and
anything above 150 as ‘very strong’, with corresponding thresholds for the reciprocals
of the Bayes factors. An alternative classification scheme was already proposed before
by Jeffreys (1961) with thresholds at 3, 10, 30, and 100 and similar labels (cf. Lee &
Wagenmakers, 2013, for updated labels).
Of course, we need to define H0 and H1. In other words, both models contain certain
parameters for which we need to determine a joint prior distribution. Here, we will
assume that data within groups are normally distributed and that both groups have an
equal variance in the population. The shape of a Normal distribution is fully determined
with the location (mean; µ) and the scale (variance; σ2) parameters. Thus, in principle,
both models contain two parameters. Now, we make two important changes. Firstly, in
the case where we have a point null hypothesis, µ under H0 is fixed to zero, leaving σ2
for H0 and µ and σ2 for H1. Parameter σ2 is a nuisance parameter because it is common
to both models. Placing a right Haar prior, pr (σ2) ∝ 1/σ2, on this nuisance parameter
(Gönen, Johnson, Lu, & Westfall, 2005; Jeffreys, 1961; see also Gronau et al., 2019) has
several desirable properties that are explained in, for example, Bayarri, Berger, Forte,
and García-Donato (2012) and Berger, Pericchi, and Varshavsky (1998). Secondly, µ
under H1 can be expressed in terms of a standardized effect size (δ; see, e.g., Gönen et
al., 2005; Rouder et al., 2009). This establishes a common and comparable scale across
experiments and populations (Rouder et al., 2009). The prior on δ could reflect certain
hypotheses that we want to test. For instance, we could compare the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = δ0 to a two-sided alternative hypotheses (H1 : δ 6= δ0) or to one of two one-sided
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alternative hypotheses (H1 : δ < δ0 or H1 : δ > δ0). Alternatively, we could compare
an interval hypothesis for the null hypothesis (H0 : ∆L < δ < ∆U) with a corresponding
alternative hypothesis (H1 : δ < ∆L OR δ > ∆U). The choice of the specific prior for δ
is a delicate matter, which is discussed in the next section.
In the most general case, the Bayes factor (i.e., BF01) can be calculated through
division of the posterior odds by the prior odds (i.e., rearranging Eq. 3):
BF01 =
(
pr (H0|D)
pr (H1|D)
)
(
pr (H0)
pr (H1)
) =
(
pr (H0|D)
pr (H0)
)
(
pr (H1|D)
pr (H1)
) ; (5)
accordingly, we can also calculate BF10:
BF10 =
(
pr (H1|D)
pr (H0|D)
)
(
pr (H1)
pr (H0)
) =
(
pr (H1|D)
pr (H1)
)
(
pr (H0|D)
pr (H0)
) . (6)
Calculating Bayes factors this way often involves solving complex integrals (see, e.g.,
Eq. 4; also cf. Wagenmakers et al., 2010). Fortunately, there is a computational shortcut
for the specific but very common scenario where we have a point null hypothesis and a
complementary alternative hypothesis. This shortcut, which is called the Savage-Dickey
density ratio (Dickey & Lientz, 1970; Kass & Raftery, 1995; see also Wagenmakers et al.,
2010, for an intuitive introduction), is explained in the Appendix.
3.2 Default Priors
Until this point in our exposition, we were quite vague about the exact form of the
prior for δ under H1. In principle, the prior for δ within H1 can be defined as desired,
satisfying the subjective needs of the researcher for a specific research setting. In fact,
this is a fundamental part of Bayesian inference because various priors allow us to express
a theory or prior beliefs (e.g., Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016; Vanpaemel, 2010). Most
commonly, however, default or objective priors are employed that aim to increase the
objectivity in specifying the prior or serve as a default when no specific prior information
is available (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961; Rouder et al., 2009; see also Consonni, Fouskakis, Liseo,
& Ntzoufras, 2018, for an extensive review of objective priors). We employ objective
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priors in our baymedr software.
In the situation where we have a point null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis
that involves a range of values, Jeffreys (1961) proposed to use a Cauchy prior with a
scale parameter of r = 1 for δ under H1. This Cauchy distribution is equivalent to a
Student’s t distribution with one degree of freedom and resembles a standard Normal
distribution, except that the Cauchy distribution has less mass at the center but instead
heavier tails (see Fig 2; see also Rouder et al., 2009). Mathematically, the Cauchy
distribution corresponds to the combined specification of (1) a Normal prior with mean
µδ and variance σ2δ on δ; and (2) an inverse Chi-square distribution with one degree of
freedom on σ2δ . Integrating out σ2δ yields the Cauchy distribution (Liang, Paulo, Molina,
Clyde, & Berger, 2008; Rouder et al., 2009). The scale parameter r defines the width of
the Cauchy distribution; that is, half of the mass lies between −r and r.
0
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Figure 2: Comparison of the standard Normal probability density function (solid line)
and the standard Cauchy probability density function (dashed line).
Choosing a Cauchy prior with a location parameter of 0 and a scale parameter of 1
has the advantage that the resulting Bayes factor is 1 in case of completely uninformative
data. In turn, the Bayes factor approaches infinity (or 0) for decisive data (Bayarri et al.,
2012; Jeffreys, 1961). Still, by varying the Cauchy scale parameter, we can set a different
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emphasis on the prior credibility of a range of effect sizes. More recently, a Cauchy prior
scale of r = 1/
√
2 is used as a golden standard in the BayesFactor software (Morey &
Rouder, 2018), the point-and-click software JASP (JASP Team, 2019), and Jamovi (The
jamovi project, 2019). We have adopted this value in our baymedr software. Nevertheless,
objective priors are often critiqued (e.g., Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; Tendeiro & Kiers,
2019); more informed priors should be utilized if relevant knowledge is available (cf., e.g.,
Gronau et al., 2019; Rouder et al., 2009).
4 Implementation and Usage of baymedr
With our baymedr software (BAYesian inference for MEDical designs in R; Linde &
van Ravenzwaaij, 2019), written in R (R Core Team, 2019), one can easily calculate Bayes
factors for superiority, non-inferiority, and equivalence designs. In the following, we will
restate the hypotheses for the superiority, non-inferiority, and equivalence designs and
explain how the corresponding Bayes factors can be calculated with baymedr. Again, we
refer the reader to the article by van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2019) for the mathematical details
(see also Gronau et al., 2019). Subsequently, we will showcase baymedr by reanalyzing
data of an empirical study by Basner et al. (2019).
4.1 Install and Load baymedr
To install the latest release of baymedr from The Comprehensive R Archive
Network (CRAN; https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=baymedr), use the following
command:
install.packages("baymedr")
The most recent version of baymedr can be obtained from GitHub (https://github
.com/maxlinde/baymedr) with the help of the devtools software (Wickham, Hester, &
Chang, 2019):
devtools::install_github("maxlinde/baymedr")
Once baymedr is installed, it needs to be loaded into memory, after which it is ready for
usage:
library("baymedr")
15
4.2 Commonalities Across Designs
For all three research designs, the user has essentially three options for data input: (1)
provide the raw data; the relevant arguments are x and y; (2) provide the sample sizes,
sample means, and sample standard deviations; the relevant arguments are n_x and n_y
for sample sizes, mean_x and mean_y for sample means, and sd_x and sd_y for sample
standard deviations; (3) provide the sample sizes, sample means, and the confidence
interval for the difference in group means; the relevant arguments are n_x and n_y for
sample sizes, mean_x and mean_y for sample means, and ci_margin for the confidence
interval margin and ci_level for the confidence level. Options 2 and 3 should be used
when the goal is to reanalyze existing findings and only certain statistics are reported in
the original source. Throughout, function arguments that have ‘x’ as a name or suffix
refer to the control condition and those with ‘y’ as a name or suffix to the experimental
condition.
The Cauchy distribution is used as the prior for the effect size under the alternative
hypothesis for all three tests. The user can set the width of the Cauchy prior with the
prior_scale argument, thus, allowing the specification of different ranges of plausible
effect sizes. baymedr uses a default Cauchy prior scale of r = 1/
√
2, complying with
the standards of the BayesFactor software (Morey & Rouder, 2018), JASP (JASP Team,
2019), and Jamovi (The jamovi project, 2019).
Once an equivalence, a non-inferiority, or a superiority test is conducted, an
informative and accessible output message is printed in the console. For all three designs,
this output states the type of test that was conducted and whether raw or summary data
were used. Moreover, the corresponding null and alternative hypotheses are restated and
the specified Cauchy prior scale is shown. In addition, the lower and upper bounds of the
equivalence interval are presented in case an equivalence test was employed; similarly, the
non-inferiority margin is printed when the non-inferiority design was chosen. Lastly, the
resulting Bayes factor is shown. To avoid any confusion, it is declared in brackets whether
the Bayes factor quantifies evidence towards the null (e.g., equivalence) or alternative
(e.g., non-inferiority or superiority) hypothesis.
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4.3 The Bayesian Superiority Test
The superiority test has a point null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 and a two-sided alternative
hypothesisH1 : δ 6= 0. Additionally, we can also define a one-sided alternative hypothesis:
To do justice to the name of the superiority test, we can define H1 : δ > 0 in the case
where higher values on the measure of interest correspond to ‘superiority’ (see Fig 1) and
H1 : δ < 0 in the case where lower values represent ‘superiority’.
Using baymedr, we can perform the Bayesian superiority test with the super_bf()
function. Depending on the research setting, low or high scores on the measure of interest
represent ‘superiority’, which can be specified by the argument direction. Moreover,
since there are diverging practices on whether to conduct a one- or two-sided test for
the superiority design, the user can choose one of the two options by using the argument
alternative. Since we seek to find evidence for the alternative hypothesis (superiority),
the Bayes factor quantifies evidence for H1 relative to H0 (i.e., BF10).
4.4 The Bayesian Non-Inferiority Test
The non-inferiority test is very similar to the superiority test. For the non-inferiority
test we have H0 : δ < −nim and H1 : δ > −nim in the case where higher values
on the measure of interest represent ‘non-inferiority’; and we have H0 : δ > nim and
H1 : δ < nim in the case where lower values represent ‘non-inferiority’ (see Fig 1). Here,
nim represents the non-inferiority margin. Note that, in contrast to the superiority test,
we do not have a point null hypothesis for the non-inferiority test (cf. van Ravenzwaaij
et al., 2019).
The Bayes factor can be calculated with the infer_bf() function. The value for the
non-inferiority margin can be specified with the ni_margin argument. The argument
ni_margin_std can be used to declare whether the non-inferiority margin was given in
standardized or unstandardized units. Lastly, depending on whether higher or lower
values on the measure of interest represent ‘non-inferiority’, one of the options ‘high’ or
‘low’ should be set for the argument direction. Here again, we wish to determine the
evidence in favor of H1; therefore, the evidence is expressed for H1 relative to H0 (i.e.,
BF10).
17
4.5 The Bayesian Equivalence Test
In the equivalence test, we compare the null hypothesis H0 : δ < ∆L OR δ > ∆U
with the alternative hypothesis H1 : δ > ∆L AND δ < ∆U . In fact, these interval
hypotheses are necessary for the frequentist equivalence test (see e.g., Meyners, 2012).
However, the Bayesian equivalence test allows either an interval hypothesis or a point
hypothesis for H0 (van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2019). Thus, with a point null hypothesis, the
hypotheses become H0 : δ = 0 and H1 : δ 6= 0, which are the same as for the two-sided
superiority test. Therefore, with a point null hypothesis, the equivalence and two-sided
superiority tests are the same. The only difference is that the equivalence test always
quantifies evidence in favor of H0 relative to H1. As such, the reciprocal of the resulting
Bayes factor for the point equivalence test is equal to the Bayes factor for the two-sided
superiority test.
baymedr can be utilized to conduct a Bayesian equivalence test with the equiv_bf
function. The desired equivalence interval can be specified with the interval argument.
Several options are possible: A symmetric equivalence interval around δ = 0 is selected in
case one value is provided (e.g., interval = 0.3) or a vector of length two, containing
the same two values for the lower and upper equivalence interval boundaries, is inserted
(e.g., interval = c(-0.3, 0.3)). In contrast, an asymmetric equivalence interval can
be specified with a vector of length two (e.g., interval = c(-0.5, 0.3)). Importantly,
the implementation of a point null hypothesis is achieved by using either interval = 0
or interval = c(0, 0), which also serves as the default specification. Moreover, the
argument interval_std can be used to declare whether the equivalence interval was
specified in standardized or unstandardized units.
4.6 Extracting Bayes Factors
When the functions for the superiority, non-inferiority, and equivalence designs
are directly evaluated (i.e., without assigning them to a variable), a summary of the
corresponding analysis and the resulting Bayes factor are printed in the console. It is
also possible to store the results of these Bayesian tests in a variable, which contains all
information of the test. In certain situations it might be desirable to further manipulate
the Bayes factor that is stored in this variable (e.g., taking the reciprocal of the Bayes
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factor). To this end, the corresponding Bayes factor needs to be extracted from the
variable. This can be done with the get_bf() function, which takes the variable as
input.
4.7 Demonstration of baymedr
To illustrate how baymedr can be used, we provide one example of an empirical study
that employed non-inferiority tests to investigate differences in the amount of sleep,
sleepiness, and alertness among medical trainees following either standard or flexible
duty-hour programs (Basner et al., 2019). The authors list several disadvantages of
restricted duty-hour programs, such as: (1) “Transitions [as a result of restricted duty
hours] into and out of night shifts can result in fatigue from shift-work–related sleep
loss and circadian misalignment.”; (2) “Preventing interns from participating in extended
shifts may reduce educational opportunities,”; (3) “increase handoffs,”; (4) “and reduce
continuity of care.”; and (5) “Restricting duty hours may increase the necessity of cross-
coverage, contributing to work compression for both interns and more senior residents.”
(Basner et al., 2019, p. 916). As outlined above, the calculation of Bayes factors for
equivalence and superiority tests is done quite similarly to the non-inferiority test, so we
do not provide specific examples for those tests. For the purpose of this demonstration,
we will only consider the outcome variable sleepiness. Participants were monitored over
a period of 14 days and were asked to indicate each morning how sleepy they were
by completing the Karolinska sleepiness scale (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990), a 9-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely alert) to 9 (extremely sleepy, fighting sleep). The
dependent variable consisted of the average sleepiness score over the whole observation
period of 14 days. The research question was whether the flexible duty-hour program
was non-inferior to the standard program in terms of sleepiness.
The null hypothesis was that medical trainees in the flexible program are sleepier by
more than a non-inferiority margin than trainees in the standard program. Conversely, the
alternative hypothesis was that trainees in the flexible program are not sleepier by more
than a non-inferiority margin than trainees in the standard program. The non-inferiority
margin was defined as 1 point on the 9-point Likert scale. All relevant summary statistics
can be obtained or calculated from Table 1 and the Results section of Basner et al. (2019).
Table 1 indicates that the flexible program had a mean of M = 4.8 and the standard
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program had a mean of M = 4.7. From the Results section we can extract that sample
sizes were n = 205 and n = 193 in the flexible and standard programs, respectively.
Further, the margin of the 95% CI of the difference between the two conditions was
0.31 − 0.12 = 0.19. Finally, lower scores on the sleepiness scale constitute favorable
(non-inferior) outcomes.
Using this information, we can calculate the Bayes factor as follows:
infer_bf(n_x = 193, n_y = 205,
mean_x = 4.7, mean_y = 4.8,
ci_margin = 0.19, ci_level = 0.95,
ni_margin = 1, ni_margin_std = FALSE,
prior_scale = 1 / sqrt(2),
direction = "low")
Note that we decided to use the default Cauchy prior scale of r = 1/
√
2 for this reanalysis.
Since our Cauchy prior scale of choice represents the default value in baymedr, it would
not have been necessary to provide this argument; however, for purposes of illustration, we
mentioned it explicitly in the function call. The output provides a user-friendly summary
of the analysis:
******************************
Non-inferiority analysis
------------------------
Data: summary data
H0 (inferiority): mu_y - mu_x > ni_margin
H1 (non-inferiority): mu_y - mu_x < ni_margin
Non-inferiority margin: 1.04 (standardised)
1.00 (unstandardised)
Cauchy prior scale: 0.707
BF10 (non-inferiority) = 4.41e+09
******************************
This large Bayes factor supports the conclusion from Basner et al. (2019) that medical
trainees in the flexible duty-hour program are non-inferior in terms of sleepiness compared
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to medical trainees in the standard program (p < .001). In other words, the data are
4.41× 109 more likely to have occurred under H1 than H0.
5 Discussion
In this article, we contrasted the common frequentist approach and the Bayesian
approach to superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority designs. We argued that the
Bayesian approach should be preferred because the application of NHST does not allow
quantifying evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (Gallistel, 2009; van Ravenzwaaij et
al., 2019; Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2018) and does not allow deviating
from a predefined sampling plan (e.g., Rouder, 2014; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018;
Schönbrodt et al., 2017). As a constructive alternative, we provided a tutorial to our
recently developed baymedr software, that allows for the easy computation of Bayes
factors for these biomedical designs. The functionality of baymedr was showcased through
a reanalysis of a medical study by Basner et al. (2019).
5.1 The Prior Distribution
There is a heated and ongoing debate in the literature about how to properly define
priors. In particular, it is argued that the specification of the prior distribution is an overly
subjective matter and that different prior distributions lead to very different resulting
Bayes factors (e.g., Kass & Raftery, 1995; Liu & Aitkin, 2008; Rouder et al., 2009;
Sinharay & Stern, 2002; Tendeiro & Kiers, 2019; Vanpaemel, 2010). Further, it is argued
that even objective prior distributions (Jeffreys, 1961; Liang et al., 2008; Rouder et al.,
2009), that try to remove this subjectivity as good as possible, do not fully solve this
problem (e.g., Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; Tendeiro & Kiers, 2019). Taking, for example,
the Cauchy prior on effect size, different Cauchy scales can result in different Bayes factors.
Indeed, in certain situations (e.g., with small or moderate sample sizes), the Bayes factor
can be sensitive to unreasonably large variations in the prior scale (Rouder et al., 2009).
As a point of demonstration, conducting a two-sided Bayesian superiority test in baymedr
with a sample size of n = 100 in each group, a mean difference of d = 0.5, and a standard
deviation of SD = 1 in both groups, we obtain BF10 ≈ 51.6 with a Cauchy prior scale of
r = 0.5 and BF10 ≈ 9.9 with a Cauchy prior scale of r = 5.
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This issue can be mitigated by sticking to the default values in the absence of specific
information from prior studies. In most scenarios, extremely large effect sizes are not
probable and, thus, large values for the Cauchy prior scale should not be chosen (cf.
Rouder et al., 2009). When prior study information is available, it is possible to utilize
this knowledge to inform the decision of the Cauchy prior scale (e.g., Dienes, 2011; Lee
& Wagenmakers, 2013; Vanpaemel, 2010). A compromise between the uninformed and
informed prior is a sensitivity/robustness analysis (Berger et al., 1994; Du, Edwards,
& Zhang, 2019; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). The idea behind
a robustness analysis is to calculate Bayes factors for a range of Cauchy prior scales
(or even entirely different priors). Using this approach, the researcher could report the
minimum and maximum Bayes factor obtained through the robustness check and openly
acknowledge the variability in the results. A robustness check is already implemented in
JASP (JASP Team, 2019) and will be considered in the future for our baymedr software.
We emphasize that even if an unreasonable prior scale was selected, a skeptical reader
can recalculate the Bayes factor with his or her own preference for the scale. For this,
however, the original researcher must fully disclose the choice of the Cauchy prior scale.
Therefore, we stress the importance of transparently reporting all data-analytic decisions.
5.2 Conclusions
Tests of superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority are important means to compare
the effectiveness of medications and treatments in biomedical research. Despite several
limitations, researchers overwhelmingly rely on traditional frequentist inference to analyze
the corresponding data for these research designs (Chavalarias et al., 2016). We believe
that Bayes factors (Goodman, 1999b; Jeffreys, 1939, 1948, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995)
are an attractive alternative to NHST and p-values because they allow researchers to
quantify evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (e.g., Gallistel, 2009; van Ravenzwaaij et
al., 2019; Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2018) and permit sequential testing
and optional stopping (e.g., Rouder, 2014; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018; Schönbrodt
et al., 2017). In fact, we believe that the possibility for optional stopping and sequential
testing has the potential to largely reduce the waste of scarce resources. This is especially
important in the field of biomedicine, where clinical trials might be expensive or even
harmful for participants.
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Our baymedr software (Linde & van Ravenzwaaij, 2019) enables researchers to conduct
Bayesian superiority, equivalence, and non-inferiority tests. baymedr is characterized by a
user-friendly implementation, making it convenient for researchers who are not statistical
experts. Furthermore, using baymedr, it is possible to calculate Bayes factors based on
raw data and summary statistics, allowing for the reanalysis of published studies, for
which the full data set is not available.
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Appendix: The Savage-Dickey Density Ratio
For the purpose of illustration, let us suppose that we have an interval null hypothesis
H0 : ∆L < δ < ∆U with a corresponding alternative hypothesis H1 : δ < ∆L OR δ > ∆U .
In principle, we can use Eq. 5 to calculate BF 01 and Eq. 6 to calculate BF 10. Crucially,
however, as the null interval decreases, pr (H0|D) /pr (H0) will dominate in the calculation
of the Bayes factor because pr (H1|D) /pr (H1) approaches 1. Put more formally, the limit
of the ratio of the posterior and the prior area under H1, as the width of the null interval
approaches 0 (i.e., a point null hypothesis), is 1:
lim
(∆U−∆L)→0
pr (H1|D)
pr (H1) = 1.
Therefore, this term can safely be ignored in the case where we have a point null
hypothesis (H0 : δ = δ0) that is nested within an alternative hypothesis that is free to
vary (H1 : δ 6= δ0, or H1 : δ < δ0, or H1 : δ > δ0). With this constellation of hypotheses,
we can simplify the calculation of the Bayes factor through the Savage-Dickey density
ratio (Dickey & Lientz, 1970; Kass & Raftery, 1995; see also Wagenmakers et al., 2010,
for an intuitive introduction). To obtain the Bayes factor (i.e., BF01) we can simply
divide the density of the posterior of H1 at the point null hypothesis by the density of
the prior of H1 at the point null hypothesis (see Fig 3). Thus, we have:
BF01 =
pr (D|H0)
pr (D|H1) =
pr (δ = δ0|D, H1)
pr (δ = δ0|H1) ,
where δ0 corresponds to the point hypothesis of H0 (e.g., δ0 = 0). Conversely, we can
calculate BF10 by dividing the density of the prior of H1 at the point null hypothesis by
the density of the posterior of H1 at the point null hypothesis (see Fig 3):
BF10 =
pr (D|H1)
pr (D|H0) =
pr (δ = δ0|H1)
pr (δ = δ0|D, H1) .
Note that the integral of a probability density function must always be 1. With the
abrupt cutoff at the point null hypothesis in case of a one-sided alternative hypothesis, the
form of the prior and posterior probability density functions might look quite different in
comparison to the probability density functions in case a two-sided alternative hypothesis
is employed.
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Figure 3: Fictitious prior (solid line) and posterior (dashed line) distributions of the
true population effect size (δ) under the alternative hypothesis H1. The Bayes factor
(i.e., BF 01) can be obtained with the Savage-Dickey density ratio (gray points and black
arrow) through division of the density of the posterior by the density of the prior at δ = δ0.
Similarly, BF 10 can be calculated by dividing the prior by the posterior at δ = δ0.
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